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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-4-103. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The language Rodney Grgich uses in his Issues Presented for Review, and in 
his Standards of Review such as "will assess the quality and quantity of the evidence" 
indicate that he is challenging the adequacy of the trial court's findings of fact as well 
as the sufficiency of the evidence used by the trial court to support its findings 
concerning the division of marital property and the award of attorney's fees to his wife 
Sharon Grgich. 
Concerning challenges to a trial court's findings of fact, the Advisory Committee 
Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" 
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). 
"On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's 
decision to 'marshal' the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Hagan v.Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted) 
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In his Appellate Brief, Rodney has neither marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, 
citing instead only to the carefully selected evidence from the second trial that 
supports the outcome he desires. Rodney made no reference to the evidence, the 
findings, or the legal conclusions of the first trial court even though the second trial 
court stated on page one of its Minute Entry: 
This Order was entered, because in the original divorce real property was awarded 
which had been titled in part in the names of the interveners and they were not then parties to 
the action. With the exception of the foregoing, the Court adopts the Memorandum Decision 
of Judge Kouris, dated January 7,2008, with respect to all of its findings and legal 
conclusions, excepting only the foregoing. (R 286) 
"[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing 
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings." Beesley v. 
Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
Accordingly, this Court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. Rodney's complete failure to marshal the evidence when 
challenging the trial court's findings must be fatal to his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Rodney and Sharon Grgich were married in May, 1967 and remained living 
together until September 2006. (R. 4 - 5) During those 39 1/3 years, Sharon bore and 
raised their 5 children into adulthood. As intimated in Rodney's brief, Sharon and 
Rodney lived and worked on the Grgich family farm for the 10 years after their 1967 
marriage. (R. 404 Pg 186 Ln 14 - 17) Between 1977 and 1993 they moved around 
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the Tooele valley several times working on the farm occasionally and living mostly in 
other locations. 
Beginning in 1967 and continuing through 2006 when she fed the cows while 
Rodney was in the hospital, Sharon worked on the farm to include moving sprinkler 
pipes, planting potatoes, driving trucks and tractors, hauling dead cows and manure, 
and helping with the harvests. (R. 404 Pg 186 Ln 1 - 25, Pg 201- Pg 203) 
Upon the death of Rodney's father in 1989, Rodney and Sharon together took 
the joint physical possession of the 26.8 acres of land, the appurtenant water rights, 
and the farm equipment referred to in this matter collectively as the farm property. 
In January 1990, Rodney received a conveyance of the record title to the farm 
and the appurtenant water rights from his father's estate. The next day Rodney 
executed the quitclaim deed for the farm property from himself to himself and three of 
his five children as joint tenants. The validity of that deed is the major subject of this 
appeal. 
In 1993, the Grgich family moved back into the trailer home located on the 
farm. Rodney and Sharon lived in the trailer home until the parties' separation in 
anticipation of divorce. During that time, all of the farm trailer's utilities drastically 
deteriorated to the point of inoperability. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 25 - Pg 179 Ln 17) After 
the separation, Sharon stayed in the trailer so that she has lived continuously in the 
trailer home on the farm since 1993 through today. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 22 - 23) The 
first trial court addressed the deplorable living conditions in the farm trailer as follows: 
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was exposed to bestial 
l iving conditions. The furnace in the parties' trailer home failed in 1993 and was 
never repaired. The plumbing in the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate. 
There is no water available in the kitchen. The water continuously leaked around the 
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base of the water heater, ultimately causing the water heater to fall through the floor. Water 
also rotted the bottom of the stove, causing Sharon to disconnect it for safety sake. 
Neither party has been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years. The trailer's 
electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never reconnected. 
During this time, any money the parties had that could be used to fix these primitive 
living conditions, was used to service the farm. For example, recently the parties had 
saved $1,200.00 to reconnect the electricity. At that same time the hay liner (hay bail 
wagon) was not working. Despite the upcoming winter, the parties decided to forego the 
electricity and repair the hay liner. All the while, the parties continued to live 
without heat, running water and electricity. Curiously, the parties somehow found the 
money to feed the livestock, buy seed potatoes and other seeds and to continually repair 
the aging farm equipment. 
Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with no utilities with the 
exception of an extension cord plugged into a neighbor's socket. Sharon now showers 
by filling a bucket with cold water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself a sponge 
bath. As well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself with cold 
sandwiches. 
Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this farm through the direct 
efforts of her labor. At trial, Rodney attempted to minimize Sharon's work effort, but oft 
times he contradicted his own deposition statements on the same subject. The parties' 
offspring also dwarfed Sharon's work effort on the farm. However, cross examination 
quickly revealed that the parties' children have aligned themselves with Rodney in this 
matter and will reap financial benefits if Rodney prevails. For these reasons, this Court 
finds Rodney and his children's statements lack credibility. (R. 54 - 53) 
By the time the parties' separated in 2006, three of the five Grgich children had 
aligned themselves with their father Rodney believing themselves to be in line to 
personally share in the sizable proceeds from the sale of the Erda farm property. At 
the first trial, Rodney produced his Exhibit #1 that listed his claimed V* share of the 
land to be worth $250,000. (R. 390 Pg 82 Ln 5 - 16) See Addendum #2 
At the time Rodney and Sharon separated, the three children's alignment with 
Rodney included their paying his rent and utilities, providing him sheltered work and 
unreported income and subsidizing his legal fees incurred during the divorce 
proceeding. (R. 391 Pg 4 Ln 1 - 8) While aligned with Rodney, the three children had 
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been isolated from and alienated against Sharon to the point of giving testimony 
detrimental to her that the trial court found lacked credibility. (R. 53) For the 12 
months between November 2006, when Rodney filed the divorce complaint and the 
first trial in November 2007, the three children continued to provide Rodney with rent 
money for a modern trailer home complete with fully operating utilities, (R. 57) while 
Sharon continued to live under bestial conditions in the old family trailer. (R. 54) 
In his divorce complaint of November 2006, Rodney claimed the farm and cows 
were solely his inherited property and asked the Court to award all of the property 
solely to him, without any mention of the three children being co-owners with him or of 
the property having been deeded into a Trust. 
Shortly after Sharon filed her answer, Rodney changed his story and began 
saying he had no ownership interest in the farm, water, equipment or cows because 
they had all been deeded into a Trust. The response to each settlement offer Sharon 
made before, during, and after the mediation session in August 2007, was that the 
Trustees did not approve her offer. 
Rodney continued to claim he had no ownership interest whatsoever in the 
farm, water, equipment or cows because they had all been deeded into a Trust, 
although each of Sharon's requests or demands to see the Trust documents made 
over the year before the first trial, such as during his deposition in October, 2007, (R, 
389 Pg 10 Ln 2 - 21) went unanswered by Rodney as did her requests made during 
the first trial in November 2007. 
During the entire first trial and all through the first session of the second trial, 
Rodney steadfastly maintained that Sharon should receive nothing from the divorce 
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action because everything he and Sharon had accumulated over the prior 40 years 
belonged solely to him and he had put everything to include the farm land, the water, 
the equipment, and all of the farm income (one half of which he had been ordered to 
pay to Sharon) (R. 390 Pg 43 Ln 19 - 20) into "The Manda Irrevocable Trust" on 
August 2, 2006, with the three children Rodney Grgich Jr., Brenda Gowans and 
Brittney Grgich as the Trustees. (R. 105) 
The parties' eldest daughter Brenda testified at the first trial that the Trust was 
set up to provide for Sharon because Rodney had a bad heart and was expected to 
pass on. (R. 404 Pg 172 Ln 8 - 11) Brenda also testified that the Trust had contained 
a provision for Sharon to have a life estate in the farm and have her utilities provided 
by the Trust, but that provision had been removed later on. (R. 404 Pg 172 Ln 15 -
23) 
Brenda and Rodney testified that although the Trust was created to care for 
Rodney and Sharon, and that it had received all of the farm income, the Trust never 
provided any financial assistance to Sharon. (R. 404 Pg 167 Ln 8 - 15) and (R. 390 
Pg 77 Ln 21 - 23) 
The first trial court made findings in its memorandum decision that Sharon was 
living in bestial conditions and was clearly in need of spousal support, but because 
Rodney was in failing health and had only a limited retirement income that had already 
been divided between him and Sharon after their separation, there was no alimony 
award available, leaving only the division of the family farm and the associated 
livestock and equipment to provide for the two parties' needs and to allow them to 
pursue their separate lives. (R. 55) 
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At the conclusion of the first trial, the court made an equitable division of the 
assets between Rodney and Sharon, having discarded Rodney's unsupported 
argument that the family farm and the associated livestock and equipment had 
previously been placed into a Trust and was not available for division between Sharon 
and Rodney. (R. 55 - 49) 
After the first trial court announced its equitable division of the assets between 
Rodney and Sharon, Rodney filed his Objection to the Findings and Decree on 
February 4, 2008. At first Rodney filed his Objection making a statute of limitations 
defense. (R. 60, U#2) The three children, wanting to intervene to claim their interests 
in the property, appeared only after Rodney's objection to the first court's ruling, that 
there was no legal basis for the alleged trust, was not disturbed after review. 
The three children complained that they had not been given their legal right to 
defend their property rights because they had not been a party to the divorce action 
nor given any notice of the trial (R. 115 fl7). The children made this post-judgment 
claim while admitting that although they had been aware of the ongoing litigation 
between their parents and they knew it had been their right under the URCP to 
intervene at any time during the divorce action before the final judgment had been 
entered, they had "waited to find out if Judge Kouris would reverse his ruling..." (R. 
113) 
The three children objected to the ruling claiming the property distribution could 
not be allowed to stand because they, as property interest holders, had the right to 
intervene and had never been given any notice of the trial (R. 115 tf7). The children 
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made this "no notice" claim even though from the outset of this action, the three 
children: 
(1) claimed to be the Trustees (that controlled all of the marital assets (R. 392 Pg 
35 Ln 20 - 21)) of the alleged Manda Irrevocable Trust which had supposedly been 
created to ensure Rodney and Sharon would have a comfortable life in their 
advanced years (R. 391 Pg 17 Ln 11 - 25); 
(2) had been presented with and had rejected multiple settlement offers from 
Sharon while acting as Trustees (R. 391 Pg 26 Ln 22 - Pg 27 Ln 17); and 
(3) Brenda Gowans, the oldest of the three children, had actually testified at the 
first trial over Sharon's objections. (R. 34) 
Over Sharon's objections, the court set aside those portions of the first divorce 
decree that concerned the division of the marital assets between Rodney and Sharon 
and gave the three children permission to intervene. This belated appearance of the 
intervening children was the sole cause of the second trial. 
After the children intervened, because of such things as their demands for time 
to conduct an appraisal (that never happened) (R. 266) and for extended time to 
appeal (that never happened) (R. 164) the case dragged on another 19 months before 
the second trial began in June 2009. 
Even though Rodney had from the outset of the second trial, repeated the claim 
that he had steadfastly maintained during the entire first trial and all during the June 
session of the second trial, that Sharon should receive no part of the farm land, water, 
equipment or farm income because it had all been deeded into the Trust,(R. 390 Pg 
85 Ln 3 - 24), on July 17, 2009, Rodney Grgich testified that during the prior week, he 
had revoked the "Manda Irrevocable Trust." (R. 391 Pg 12 Ln 10 -15) 
After conducting three sessions of the second trial and after having heard 
Rodney abandon his "the trust owns everything" defense to Sharon being awarded an 
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equitable share of the marital property, and after having heard the three intervening 
Grgich children claim that they together owned % of the farm's real property and 
water, the second trial court entered its ruling declaring the 1990 Quitclaim Deed to be 
invalid because when Rodney deeded the property to three of his children as joint 
tenants with himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. (R 
283) 
The second trial court also found that by his use of the land from 1989 to the 
present, his borrowing against the land with and without the children's participation, his 
attempts to sell the land, and his keeping all of the proceeds, Rodney's conduct led 
Sharon to believe that the 1989 quit-claim deed did not constitute a transfer at that time 
and that he was therefore estopped from claiming that the 1989 quit-claim was a valid 
transfer, or that either the legal principle of laches or the statute of limitations applied 
to Sharon's claim for a martial interest in the farm property. 
After the second trial, Rodney filed this appeal in October 2009. Mostly 
because Rodney and the three children successfully stalled the production of the 
transcripts of the first trial that Sharon needed to respond to this Appeal until the fourth 
November after the divorce complaint had been filed, Sharon to this day, continues to 
languish through yet another winter in the bestial conditions of the farm trailer due to 
lack of money to improve her living conditions or even install the basic utilities of heat, 
electricity, and running water because she has been left without enough money to do 
otherwise. (R. 404 Pg 182 Ln 19 - 25) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rodney Grgich brought before this Court five issues for review claiming that the 
second trial court used insufficient evidence as the basis of its findings and made 
errors in its ruling concerning the Statute of Limitations, made an inequitable 
distribution of marital property and improperly awarded attorney's fees to Sharon 
Grgich. 
Throughout his appellant's brief, Rodney failed to make any measurable 
attempt to marshal the evidence that is readily available in the record of the two trials 
and even misrepresented the actual status of one of his five issues. 
Conversely, Sharon has provided to this Court many references to the record 
wherein substantial evidence exists to defeat Rodney's un-marshaled claims of errors 
concerning the application of the Statute of Limitations. Sharon has also addressed 
Rodney's unsupported claims of the inequitable distribution of marital property by 
referring the Court to the facts developed during two trials on that issue. 
Over the last four years, Rodney did not complain that his ex-wife, after raising 
five children and 40 years of marriage, received no alimony award based upon his 
lack of current income. Rodney did however, repeatedly demand throughout the trial 
process that Sharon receive no portion of the assets accumulated during the parties' 
marriage based upon his various reasons that were offered and then withdrawn when 
investigated to any degree. 
Over the last four years, Rodney was dishonest and evasive throughout the two 
trials and the trial court found his sworn testimony to be not credible. (R. 282) In sum, 
Rodney came to this appeal with completely unclean hands. 
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Sharon has expended significant resources that she does not currently possess 
in responding to Rodney's continuous campaign to keep her living in the most bestial 
conditions and has asked this Court based upon her history of prevailing in each 
action to allow her to recover both the award of fees she received from the second trial 
court and the fees she has incurred in responding to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I . STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT APPLY 
A. Quiet Title Action Asserted by Interveners, Not by Sharon 
Part A of Rodney's first argument claims Sharon did not assert a true Quiet 
Title claim in order "to quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile claim of 
another." Rodney goes on to state "Interveners, rather that Appellee, would be the 
party which would have asserted this claim because they had the existing title and the 
adverse claim was Appellee's" The children demanded "to intervene in this matter so 
that they may protect their property interest and assert their claims and defenses" (R. 
113) 
The second trial court correctly addressed Rodney's statute of limitations 
defense in its Minute Entry findings by stating: 
His control of the property included use of the land, borrowing against the land, 
attempts to sell the land, and keeping all of the proceeds, and during this conduct from 
1989 to the present he led his spouse, the respondent, to believe that the 1989 quit-claim 
deed did not constitute a transfer at that time and by his conduct he is therefore estopped 
from claiming that the 1989 quit-claim was a valid transfer, or that either the legal 
principle of laches or the statute of limitations applies to her claim for an interest in the 
property. See also Nolan v. Hoopiiana 2006 UT 53,144 P3d 1129. (R 283) 
Sharon agrees with both of these statements in that, as Rodney correctly 
states, Sharon never claimed to hold legal title to the farm, water, or equipment, but 
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rather, after 40 years of marriage, as the second trial court stated in its finding, she 
claimed an "interest in the property" believing, as was stated in her answer to the 
divorce complaint, that she was "entitled to receive 1A of the value of the martial estate 
to include the real property she has lived on for the last 19 years and the herd of cattle 
she has helped to feed over the same period of time.u (R. 12) 
As Rodney affirmed in the third paragraph of his argument, it was the three 
intervening Grgich children, not Sharon, that brought the alleged Quiet Title action to 
life. The children's demand to perfect an existing title against Sharon's hostile claim 
(for her marital interest in the farm) was made by the children based upon a quitclaim 
deed Rodney granted from himself to himself and the three children as joint tenants in 
January 1990. (R. 108) 
However, as the second trial court ultimately and correctly ruled, the 1990 deed 
was void, thus had no legal efficacy. "A thing is void which is done against law at the 
very time of doing it, and where no person is bound by the act." See, e.g., Mut. 
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Winne, 20 Mont. 20, 49 P. 446, 449 (1897) In Ockey v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, the Utah Supreme Court wrote in U 10, "A contract 
or a deed that is void cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity 
in court." 
Because the trial court properly found that the 1990 deed was void, the three 
children never acquired any ownership interest in the farm at any time and Sharon had 
every legal right to attack the deed's validity in court, regardless of the passage of time 
or lack of notice to the children, thus defeating Rodney's statute of limitations defense. 
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Further, because the deed was void (as described in detail below), both trial 
courts had the duty, not just the ability to determine the distribution of the marital 
property consisting of the farm, water, and equipment, regardless of how much time 
had passed between Rodney's creation of the invalid deed and the entry of the 
divorce decree and regardless of the children's claim of needing adequate notice to 
protect their interests. 
B. Claim is still Not Barred by Statute of Limitations 
The second paragraph of Part B of Rodney's first argument correctly identifies 
the trial court's invalidation of the January 25, 1990 Quitclaim Deed as the actual legal 
issue for which he is requesting appellate review. However in that second paragraph, 
Rodney simply states without citation, supporting argument or any legal analysis, 
"[tjhat claim is subject to the statute of limitations, and therefore, barred." 
While Rodney devotes several paragraphs of his brief to the premises that the 
statute of limitations does not apply to actions where the claimant is in actual 
possession of the property as held by the Utah Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Petty, 
225 P.3d 874 (Utah 2009), all such argument is not pertinent here because Sharon 
did not assert a Quiet Title claim. However, had Sharon asserted a Quiet Title claim, 
no statute of limitations would apply here because Sharon was in actual possession of 
the property in question for the 13 years immediately prior to the filing of this divorce 
action by Rodney. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 22 - 23) 
Contra to the unsupported statement made in Rodney's argument that Sharon 
was not in possession of the farm, Sharon and Rodney lived on the farm continuously 
from 1993 until they separated in October 2006. At the time of, and after the parties' 
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separation, Sharon remained living on the farm where she remains today, while 
Rodney moved to town and lived in a trailer provided for him rent free by the three 
intervening children. (R. 404 Pg 31 Ln 8 -10) 
Despite Rodney's unsupported claims in his argument that Sharon "did not pay 
the taxes or pay the mortgage," she has been in actual possession of the farm 
continuously since 1993, in that her actual possession exists where the property is in 
her immediate occupancy and physical control. See Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th 
ed. 1990) Until Rodney moved to Tooele in October 2006, he and Sharon shared joint 
actual possession of the property, after which, Sharon assumed the sole actual 
possession. Id. 
Concerning Rodney's argument that Sharon "did not pay the taxes or pay the 
mortgage,"the first trial court stated: 
There is no question that, throughout this marriage, Sharon significantly 
participated in the workings of the farm. Equally as clear, is the fact that Sharon was 
not compensated for her work as a "farm hand" would be paid. Instead, Sharon and 
Rodney received compensation similar to that of any business owner. The profits or 
losses were co-mingled into the couple's personal household finances. (R.52) 
Such co-mingling would prove that Sharon's contributions to the enterprise 
must be given equal credit to those of Rodney, to include the payment of taxes and 
the mortgage. 
The last paragraph of Part B contains the sentence "[t]he thai court treated the 
water rights the same as the farm property"followed by the sentence "Any claim for 
the water rights should be barred by the statute of limitations." 
Rodney's first statement concerning the treatment of the water rights by the trial 
court is correct but creates no controversy because in Utah, title to water rights is 
16 
adjudicated in the same fashion as title to real property. See Church v. Meadow 
Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1983). However, Rodney's follow-
on claim of a statute of limitations bar to litigation of the ownership status of the water 
rights, again made without citation, supporting argument or any legal analysis, simply 
has no merit. 
Rodney acquired the water rights appurtenant to the farm as an inheritance 
from his father (R. 404 Pg 37 Ln 4) via the same personal representative's deed that 
conveyed the land to him. (R. 111 -110) Rodney's purported transfer of an ownership 
interest in the water appurtenant to the farm from himself to the three children was 
evidenced solely by the Quitclaim Deed of January 25, 1990. See Addendum #3. 
Therefore, the validity of any transfer of ownership interests in the water rights 
appurtenant to the farm was subject to the very same analysis by the trial court as was 
the validity of the same Quitclaim Deed for the farm land. Because the 1990 quitclaim 
deed was determined to be void, the three children never acquired any interest in the 
water at any time and Sharon had every legal right to attack the children's claims to 
the water regardless of the passage of time or lack of notice to the children, thus 
defeating Rodney's second statute of limitations defense. 
I I . THERE WAS ADEQUATE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
THAT THE 1990 QUITCLAIM DEED WAS INVALID 
Rodney's second argument claims Sharon did not present clear and convincing 
evidence to the second trial court that the deed was invalid. Rodney goes on to state 
the dispute is whether Rodney "delivered the deed to the Interveners/Appellants with 
the present intent to transfer" 
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In Utah, a quitclaim deed has the effect of a conveyance only when "executed 
as required by law." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1994). This has been interpreted to 
mean that a deed must be in writing, see Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995); signed by 
the creator, see id.; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 34 (1956); supported by consideration, see 
Cereghino v. Einberg, 4 Utah 514, 11 P. 568 (Utah 1886); and delivered to the 
grantee. 
There was never any evidence presented at any time that Rodney received any 
consideration from the three very young children (daughter was 6 years old R. 390 Pg 
49 Ln 22) in exchange for his execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed. Rodney's 
deposition testimony was that the children paid him nothing for the deed to the farm. 
(R. 389 Pg 7 Ln 3 - 7) Without evidence of consideration from the children to Rodney, 
the quitclaim deed lacks the effect of a conveyance thus was invalid for lack of 
consideration. 
The first trial court never ruled on the issue of the validity of the 1990 quitclaim 
deed because Rodney never mentioned to anyone that the children had any interest 
in the farm until after the first trial court ruled that: 
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the amount and kind of 
property (land, water shares and farming equipment); the parties standard of living and 
financial conditions (desperate for both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities (little 
if any); the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has given up for this 
marriage (see above): 
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of the interest and ownership that 
Rodney had in the farm land, the associated water rights, and farm equipment 
when Rodney inherited it from his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon, (R 39) 
Further, at trial some evidence was produced alleging that the farm, water rights and 
farm equipment has been subsequently transferred into a trust and are therefore 
inaccessible for property distribution by this Court. In fact, NO documents were entered 
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into evidence verifying the existence of this trust. This trust is not recorded by the 
appropriate county recorder or any other governmental entity against these assets. Finally, 
the trial unearthed many facts that question the motivation and legitimacy of the alleged 
trust. These irregularities include: transferring tractors into the names of children who were 
nine, five and one year(s) old at the time of the transfer; transferring livestock into the 
trust three months prior to filing for divorce without an accompanying required "brand 
inspection" or any other legal indicia of a transfer; and Rodney's transferring all of his assets 
into the trust without compensation and without retaining sufficient assets to satisfy his 
outstanding obligations. Therefore, this Court also finds: 
There is no legal basis for the alleged trust discussed in trial, therefore this 
Court has the ability to equitably divide said assets. (R 38) See Addendum #1. 
At the conclusion of the second trial that included the three children as 
interveners, and having heard Rodney abandon his prior "the Trust owes everything" 
defense to the distribution of marital assets to Sharon on July 17, 2009, the second 
trial court addressed the evidence presented concerning the invalid nature of 
Rodney's 1990 quitclaim deed and the children's relationship to the subject property 
by stating in its findings,: 
One who asserts the invalidity of a deed must prove the invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence. The deed in question was signed and recorded, and therefore was 
presumed to be delivered. The quit-claim deed was not secret, and respondent learned of 
it sometime after the transfer and many years before the start of the divorce action... 
The only person who has control of this real property since 1989 is the petitioner. He 
has borrowed against the property without the children's knowledge or consent, and 
sometimes with one or two children's knowledge and consent, and over the objections of 
another child. He has always done what he wanted with the property. Only petitioner has 
taken profits from the property, the children have never shared in any profits or any 
deductions. Had petitioner intended present conveyance in 1989, his use of the property 
without the participation of the other joint tenants would have violated Utah law. 
When petitioner deeded the property to three of his children as joint tenants with 
himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. (R 284 - 283) 
(emphasis added) 
In sum, the second trial court ruled the 1990 quitclaim deed was invalid. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines INVALID to mean "not of legal efficacy" or the 
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equivalent of void and defines VOID to mean "an instrument which is wholly 
ineffective, inoperative, and incapable of ratification and which thus has no force or 
effect so that nothing can cure it." (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th ed. 1990) 
Because the 1990 quitclaim deed was void, such as is a void judgment, it is 
one which from its inception is, and forever continues to be of no legal force and effect 
whatsoever. Id. 
The second court found the 1990 quitclaim deed to be void because Rodney 
did not intend to convey a present interest in the property when he deeded the 
property to three of his children as joint tenants with himself. (R. 283) 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed this issue in detail by stating in the 
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff ruling: 
When a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present interest in 
property, it is invalid. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984). Courts 
have consistently held that a conveyance is valid only upon delivery of a deed 
with the present intent to transfer. Baker, 684 P.2d at 635. Intention is the 
essence of delivery and is of primary and controlling importance. Lenhart v. 
Desmond, 705 P.2d 338, 342 (Wyo.1985). The grantor's present intent must be 
to pass his or her title interest to the grantee and divest himself of the same; 
otherwise the purported deed is not valid or effective. Den-Gar Enter, v. Romero, 
94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Ct.App.1980). Anderson v. Brinkerhoff756 
P.2d 95, 100 (Utah App. 1988) 
As Rodney stated in his Issues Presented for Review #2, for him to challenge 
the "quality and quantity" of the evidence concerning the invalid nature of the 1990 
quitclaim deed, Rodney "must begin by undertaking the arduous and painstaking 
marshaling process." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Although in Rodney's argument, he states that "[tjhere was considerable 
evidence taken at trial to ascertain Petitioner/Appellant's intent" to transfer a present 
interest to the children when he executed the deed, in his brief, Rodney has 
completely failed "to present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, any scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the findings he resists." Rather 
than present every scrap of competent evidence available as required, Rodney's brief 
made no reference whatsoever to the evidence presented, nor to the findings, nor to 
the legal conclusions of the first trial court and provided scant and very guardedly 
selected citations to the record of the second trial. 
In his argument, having made no effort to marshal the evidence that was 
presented to either trial court, Rodney made one single citation to the record from the 
second trial to support his contention that "Appellee did not present clear and 
convincing evidence that the 1990 quitclaim was invalid" when he wrote that "As the 
minute entry states, Petitioner/Appellant transferred the farm property 'for the purpose 
of receiving favorable property tax and inheritance tax treatment/ (R. 280)." 
However, Rodney's cited page (R. 280) makes no mention whatsoever about 
"Petitioner/Appellant transferred the farm property for the purpose of receiving 
favorable property tax and inheritance tax treatment" 
The second trial court's minute entry does state on page 4: 
When petitioner deeded the property to three of his children as joint tenants with 
himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. The deed was for 
some other purpose, possibly tax or inheritance treatment, but in his testimony, Mr. 
Grgich made it clear he was following the advice of a relative and did not understand 
what the legal effect of the transfer would be with respect to property taxes or inheritance 
taxes, and in fact it appeared that what understanding he does have is directly contrary to the 
actual effect that said transfer would have had. (R. 283) 
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Because Rodney utterly failed to marshal any evidence, Sharon takes this 
opportunity to inform this Court that contra to Rodney's assertion, the evidence that 
was presented to the two trial courts as follows, clearly and convincingly established 
Rodney had no intent whatsoever to transfer a present ownership interest in the farm 
to three of his children via the Quitclaim Deed dated January 25, 1990. 
In November 2006, Rodney stated in his Verified Divorce Complaint that he 
"shall be awarded the sole possession, right title and interest of the property he 
inherited which is located Erda, Utah, and the cattle which he inherited and owns." (R. 
2-3) (emphasis added) 
In his divorce complaint, Rodney mentioned nothing whatsoever about having 
three Joint Tenant co-owner's of the farm. Nor did the complaint filed in November 
2006, mention anything whatsoever about the "The Manda Irrevocable Trust" into 
which all of the farm property had allegedly been deeded or transferred on August 2, 
2006. (R. 105) 
One year later, during his deposition on October 31, 2007, Rodney claimed 
under oath that he had no ownership interest whatsoever in the farm land, water, or 
equipment when he testified: 
Buhler Q. Who are the trustees? 
Rodney A. Okay, my oldest daughter, Brenda K. Gowans; Rodney Jr., 
and Brittney K. 
Q. They're the trustees? 
A. They're trustees and they're also the owners. 
Q. And you're not? 
A. I'm not. 
Q. So you have no ownership interest in the farm? 
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A. Not anymore. I'm out of it. Since a year ago, 2nd of August, it 
would be 2006. 
Q. And so the trustees are the beneficiaries? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you claim no ownership interest in that farm 
whatsoever? 
A. None at all. 
(R. 389 Pg 6 Ln 1 - Pg 7 Ln 2) (emphasis added) 
One year after that testimony, on November 15, 2007, during his direct 
examination at the first trial, Rodney made the following statements: 
Broadhead Q. Why did you put Brenda, Brittney and Rodney, Jr. on the deed? 
Rodney A. Tax purposes. It's a direct inheritance. They won't have to go because 
it's survivorship, they would not have to go through probate on it. . . 
Q. So you did that for tax purposes and for inheritance purposes? 
A. Right, inheritance, too. 
(R. 404 Pg 39 Ln 12 - 24) (emphasis added) 
At that first trial, during his cross examination conducted by Sharon's attorney, 
Rodney made the following statements: 
Buhler Q. You testified that when you did that {Recorded the Quit Claim Deed} 
you did that for tax purposes? 
Rodney A. Right. 
Q. You did is so that if you died the children would inherit it? That for tax 
purposes and for inheritance purposes? 
A. Right. 
Q. You had no intention of giving that land to them in their ownership 
on that day, did you? 
A. They could have had it immediately. It didn't had nothing to do with it. 
Q. Sir? 
A. If I passed away one minute after I signed that, they could have 
had it, no problem. 
Q. Exactly, they could have had it after you were dead? 
A. Right. (R. 404 Pg 92 Ln 20 - Pg 93 Ln 11) 
23 
In addition to Rodney's testimony at the deposition and two trials, his exhibit #8 
provided the court with clear and convincing evidence that on no less than five 
occasions, Rodney used the property to secure loans by granting trust deeds to 
various lenders with none or only some of the alleged joint tenant co-owners 
participating in granting the trust deeds. When questioned about how he received a 
loan against the land without all of the co-owner's endorsements, Rodney claimed 
incredibly, that the loan had been secured by only !4 of the single parcel of land. (R. 
390 Pg 105 Ln 1 - 19) See Addendum #4 with the five attached Trust Deeds which 
demonstrate that: 
On December 23, 1994, Rodney alone granted a trust deed to Pacific Rim 
Financial Services. 
On November 16, 1995, Rodney Sr., Rodney Jr., and Brittney Kaye Grgich 
together granted a trust deed, but excluded Brenda Gowans. 
On December 23, 1997, Rodney alone granted another trust deed to Pacific 
Rim Financial Services. 
On December 23, 1998, Rodney Sr., and Rodney Jr., together granted a trust 
deed to Utah Mortgage Center but excluded Brittney Kaye Grgich and 
Brenda Gowans. 
On December 17, 1999, Rodney Sr., and Rodney Jr., together again granted a 
trust deed to Utah Mortgage Center but excluded Brittney Kaye Grgich and 
Brenda Gowans. 
Even without the additional evidence provided by the five Trust Deeds or the 
trial court's recognition that Rodney has always done what he wanted with the property, 
that he was the only person who had control of this real property since 1989 and only he 
had taken profits from the property (R. 284 - 283), Rodney's trial testimony that the 
three children could have had the farm 'afterhe were dead" was adequate clear 
and convincing evidence for the trial court to determine that the 1990 Quitclaim 
Deed was invalid because it clearly established that Rodney did not have the 
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necessary present intent to transfer to the children any portion of his ownership and 
control over the farm and divest himself of the same when he executed the deed 
from himself to himself and the three children as joint tenants. 
I I I . THE COURT DID NOT AWARD PROPERTY OF THIRD PARTIES 
TO SHARON GRGICH 
Rodney's third argument alleging the trial court awarded water rights belonging 
to third parties to Sharon is not only an attempt to have a fourth bite at the apple by 
bringing in another relative of Rodney's (Jerry Grgich) seeking once again to intervene 
post-judgment, the argument is a complete scam. 
Rodney cites to the record at (R. 319 - 355) to support his misrepresentation 
that "[tjhese third parties have filed a motion to intervene and a motion for relief of 
judgment," but he fails to tell anyone that his brief is presenting argument for his 
brother Jerry Grgich, not himself and he certainly did not direct this Court's attention to 
the portion of the record where his brother Jerry withdrew his Motion to Intervene and 
Motion for Relief from Judgment on December 23, 2009. Because Rodney's brief was 
drafted and submitted on April 12, 2010, several months after Jerry's withdrawal of his 
Motions, there is no valid reason this misrepresentation should have occurred in 
Rodney's brief. 
I V . THE DIVISION OF THE MARTIAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE 
Rodney correctly states that to reverse the second trial courts' award of the 
marital property, he has the burden of compiling every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced during two trials which supports the property award and then, using that 
evidence, he must convince this Court that the trial court abused its very broad 
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discretion in making that property award to Sharon. Although in his brief, Rodney 
cited to Stonehockerv. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, fl 29, 176 P.3d 476, in his un-
marshaled argument to support his proposition that here, in the second court's 
findings, a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion exists because Rodney was 
assigned more debt that was Sharon, that argument completely ignores the very 
detailed findings of the first trial court which gave a detailed analysis of existing case 
law concerning property division and assigned specific values to all of the equipment 
and martial debt. A summary of the several pages of findings concerning the division 
of property, demonstrates that the first court addressed the lack of any alimony award 
and Rodney's claim that the farm, water and equipment was his inheritance or was 
conveyed to a Trust when it stated: 
"The overreaching aim of a property division,..., is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result 
between the parties. Stated more specifically, the purpose of property divisions is to 
allocate property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best 
permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble, (citations omitted). 
"[I]n appropriate circumstances, a party may be awarded property which the other 
spouse brought into the marriage. In fashioning an equitable property division, trial 
courts must consider all of the pertinent circumstances, including the amount and kind 
of property to be divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, the parties' 
standard of living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, 
the duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the 
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded." Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, (citations omitted). In addition, a "wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share 
of the financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties' joint efforts during the 
marriage." Lee v. Lee, (citations omitted). 
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was exposed to bestial 
l iving conditions. The furnace in the parties' trailer home failed in 1993 and was 
never repaired. The plumbing in the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate... 
Neither party has been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years. The trailer's 
electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never reconnected. . . 
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Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with no utilities with the 
exception of an extension cord plugged into a neighbor's socket. Sharon now showers 
by filling a bucket with cold water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself and 
sponge bath. As well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself with 
cold sandwiches. . . Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this 
farm through the direct efforts of her labor. . . There is no question that, throughout this 
marriage, Sharon significantly participated in the workings of the farm. 
Equally as clear, is the fact that Sharon was not compensated for her work as a 
"farm hand" would be paid. . .This co-mingling is also apparent in the couple's tax 
filings.. . At trial, there was no evidence produced or even alleged that the farms' 
finances and parties' personal finances were EVER kept separate... (R 42 - 40) 
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the amount and kind of 
property (land, water shares and farming equipment); the parties standard of living and 
financial conditions (desperate for both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities 
(little if any); the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has given up 
for this marriage (see above): 
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of the interest and 
ownership that Rodney had in the farm land, the associated 
water rights, and farm equipment when Rodney inherited it 
from his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon. (R. 39) 
Apparently, Rodney did not like the outcome of the first trial, so he took a 
second bite at the apple by having the three children intervene post-judgment thereby 
directly causing the second trial concerning property distribution to occur. Apparently, 
Rodney did not like the outcome of the second trial any better, so he took a third bite 
at the apple by having his brother Jerry intervene again post-judgment to the second 
judgment. However, as stated above, Jerry withdrew his Motion to Intervene. (R. 384) 
Rodney then took his fourth bite at the apple by filing this appeal and therein 
making his completely un-marshaled argument that the result of four years of litigation 
should be reversed because Sharon was awarded a 1984 GMC pickup outside of the 
order to sell the marital assets. Rodney's horrendous abuse of the court process, to 
stall or deny for many months, Sharon's receipt of property in the manner which best 
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serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives, 
directly led the second trial court to award Sharon her attorney's fees. 
V . THERE WAS NO ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST THE PETITIONER 
Rodney's condensed argument that "one must conclude" the trial court 
awarded Sharon her fees based upon Utah Code Ann. §78B-27-825 implies he 
cannot tell why the award was made or who is "subject to the Order"' awarding Sharon 
her attorney's fees even though the court's decision clearly states the award was 
made "because of petitioner's conduct in attempting to prevent her from receiving a 
fair share of marital assets" (R. 280). Rodney has once again made just one citation 
to the record rather than investing the time to marshal the evidence before the two trial 
courts. Rodney's argument failed to mention no attorney's fees were awarded in the 
original divorce decree. 
Rodney's discussion of UCA §78B-27-825 in his brief may be interesting, 
however, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) is the controlling statute and states in pertinent 
part: 
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon 
the claim or defense. 
When awarding fees under subsection (2), the court "may disregard the 
financial need of the moving party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
("In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees 
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is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party.") 
The guiding factor in fee awards under subsection (2) is whether the party 
seeking an award of fees substantially prevailed on the claim. Fee awards under 
subsection (2) serve no equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees 
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d 
at 850-51. 
In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses to comply 
with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such that the other party "is compelled 
to bring proceedings against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that order. 
Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the moving party so that he or she is not forced "to fritter away in costs and 
counsel fees" the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated actions to 
enforce payment. . . ." Id. 
Further, because Sharon's attorney submitted an affidavit to the trial court 
describing in detail each of the legal services provided to her and billed at an hourly 
rate which was well below the usual and customary fee for services of this type in this 
location, and because Rodney never disputed the reasonableness of the fees nor 
challenged the court's finding at the time the award was made so that the trial court 
could address the concern at the trial court level, the trial court would have abused its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless the reduction was 
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warranted by one or more of the factors described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 987-91 (Utah 1988) 
Rodney belatedly challenges the award of fees although once again, he 
completely failed to marshal any of the legions of evidence available to the second 
trial court concerning his conduct throughout the 33 months immediately preceding the 
award, whereby he fully earned the right to pay his ex-wife's costs and attorney's fees. 
Rodney asks the Court of Appeals to completely overlook an extensive record 
that is heavily laden with incidents of his self-contradictory testimony and outright 
refusal to testify on several issues. Rodney also failed to mention to this Court that by 
his dishonest and evasive resistance to cooperation (when first sworn as a witness he 
would not promise to tell truth) (R. 390 Pg 12 Ln 1 - 11) and numerous courtroom 
outbursts during both trials, to include leaving the witness stand mid-way through his 
examination (R. 390 Pg 63 Ln 5 -10), Rodney pushed the second trial court to the 
point of the unusual action of having him handcuffed and taken into the holding cell 
adjacent to the court room. (R. 277) 
In this domestic case, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provided the authority for the 
second trial court to award Sharon the costs and attorney fees she incurred upon 
determining that she substantially prevailed upon her multiple claims of Rodney 
refusing to obey the order of the court {(Sharon's Attorney fess reserved for trial 
on January 24, 2007 (R. 23); Rodney's contempt for failing to pay her Y2 of farm 
income certified and attorney's fees reserved for trial, July 7, 2008 (R. 211)} and her 
claim concerning the second division of property as stated by the second trial court: 
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"This Order was entered, because in the original divorce real property was awarded which 
had been titled in part in the names of the interveners and they were not then parties to the 
action." (R. 286) 
Finally, Rodney's "defense asserted in good faith" argument falls to its quick 
and ugly death once the Court reviews Rodney's still ongoing shill game to delay and 
deny Sharon any chance to escape her bestial living conditions, such as his initial 
claims of all of the martial property belonging to an "irrevocable trust" during the first 
trial, followed by his claim that the "irrevocable trust" had been revoked just prior to the 
second day of the second trial, (R. 276) or the entire second trial which had been 
precipitated by his children's claims of inadequate notice, even though Rodney's 
oldest daughter Brenda Gowans attended and even testified at the first trial on 
November 15, 2007. (R.404 Pg 155 - 175) Another example of Rodney's deny and 
delay tactics occurred when on February 4, 2008 (R. 60 U#3) Rodney filed his 
objection to the first Findings wherein he claimed some of the water belonged to his 
brother (Jerry Grgich) and yet 21 months later, on November 5, 2009, after the second 
judgment had been entered, Rodney's brother Jerry appeared, claiming that he must 
be allowed to intervene and moved the trial court to set aside the judgment because of 
lack of notice to him. (R. 355) 
Sharon's position is the award of fees was properly made by the trial court to 
allow her, as the prevailing party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to 
Rodney's recalcitrance and his dishonest and evasive conduct. (R. 277) 
The award of fees was based on adequate and detailed evidence which 
Rodney never disputed nor challenged at the trial court level and his challenge made 
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to this Court was not supported by any credible evidence, thus the award of attorney's 
fees by the trial court should stand as entered. 
Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees Upon Appeal 
In divorce actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the 
receiving spouse [prevails] on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal." 
(quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, H 43, 45 P.3d 176), Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, U 11, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Rodney's dishonest and evasive actions in court during two trials, his multiple 
incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his decisively 
inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause Sharon to remain living, for 
more than four years, in horrendous conditions that should be completely 
unimaginable in the State of Utah while he has enjoyed living with all of the modern 
utilities during the many months it has already taken and will continue to take for him 
to receive his fourth bite at this apple. 
This appeal was not well taken for good cause and has directly caused Sharon 
to accumulate additional attorney's fees and costs that exceed the fees she was 
forced to incur in the trial court. Therefore, Sharon hereby explicitly and respectfully 
requests that she be allowed to recover the attorney's fees incurred on appeal out of 
Rodney's share of the proceeds from the previously ordered sale of the marital assets 
and/or immediately from the interveners in an amount to be determined by the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant's dishonest and evasive actions in court during two trials, his 
multiple incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his decisively 
inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause his ex-wife of 40 years a great 
injustice. 
Rodney, through the deceit of his children, demanded a second trial on the 
issue of the division of marital property and then used his brother to demand a third 
trial. Once that demand was withdrawn from the trial court, he filed his appellant's 
brief in this Court, in which he completely failed to marshal the evidence as required 
by the Rules of Appellate Procedure and apparently intentionally misrepresented the 
status of his third issue on appeal. 
The response to Rodney's appeal required of Sharon has caused her to incur 
substantial additional attorney's fees in addition to those properly awarded to her by 
the second trial court. She has prevailed on the issues presented to the first trial 
court. She has prevailed on the issues presented to the second trial court, and 
assuming with good cause that she will prevail on this appeal, Sharon has asked this 
Court to award her the fees she has incurred herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS January 12, 2011. 
A&— 
Gary Butiler 
Attorney for Sharon Grgich, Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of January, 2011,1 served 2 copies and 
a PDF disk of the forgoing document, by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in 
the United States Mails, addressed to: 
Scott A. Broadhead 
P.O. Box 1141 
Tooele Utah 84074 
(jary Buhler 
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Addendum #1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RODNEY FRANK GRGICH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SHARON GRGICH, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
(BENCH TRIAL) 
CASE NO. 064300444 
Judge Mark S. Kouris 
This Court tried the above captioned matter on 15 November 2007. 
Petitioner, Rodney Frank Grgich ("Rodney"), was represented by Mr. 
Scott A. Broadhead. Respondent, Sharon Grgich ("Sharon"), was 
represented by Mr. Gary Buhler. 
This Court evaluated the sworn Financial Declarations of the 
parties, reviewed all other written documentation and received 
testimony. 
This Court Amends the original Memorandum Decision because of an 
arithmetic error in the distribution of personal assets and debts. 
This decision reflects the these corrections. 
Background 
The parties married in May 1967 in Elko, Nevada. They purchased 
a trailer home and lived on Rodney's father's farm ("the farm"). Then, 
starting in 1977, they lived for a time in Tooele, Terra and Dugway, 
Utah. Facing continuing financial difficulties, they lost many houses 
1 
through repossession or eviction. In 1993, they moved back to the 
trailer on the farm. 
At the time of the parties1 marriage, Rodney worked at the 
Tooele Smelter and in 1968 began working at the Tooele Army Depot. In 
1993, he retired to focus his efforts on his farming. In 1999, he also 
began driving part-time for Capital Roofing, but was forced to quit 
because of a heart condition. Since the fall of 2006, Rodney has 
lived in a modern trailer complete with fully operating utilities. Due 
to his heart condition, Rodney currently does not work but earns 
$215.00 per month from social security and one-half of his federal 
retirement, which is $445.00, which equals $660.00 per month. The 
parties1 children pay Rodney's rent and supplement his income each 
month so he can cover his expenses. 
At the time of the marriage, Sharon occasionally worked outside 
the home. Upon the birth of the first of the parties' five children, 
Sharon quit her job and became a full-time mother. While raising the 
couple's children, she spent a considerable amount of time working on 
the farm (discussed in detail below). Sharon currently lives in the 
parties original trailer and works at Macy's food store where she earns 
$770.00 per month plus one-half of Rodney's federal retirement' 
($445.00) which equals $1,215.00 per month. 
1 This entire retirement account accrued during the parties' marriage 
and will therefore continue be divided equally between the parties. 
In 1989, Rodney's father reposed. Rodney's father willed the 26.8 
acre farm, the associated water rights, and the farm equipment to Rodney. 
In January 1990, Rodney received the actual deed willing him the 
2 
mentioned items. Rodney immediately executed a quick-claim deed 
transferring whatever ownership interest he had at that time over to 
three of his children. Rodney testified that perceived favorable 
property tax and inheritance tax treatment were his only motivation for 
the transfer. Sharon's name has never been on the deeds of ownership 
for the land, water shares or farm equipment. 
With this background in place, this Court was asked to determine 
alimony and to equitably split the parties1 assets. During the course 
of trial, both attorneys conceded that, when considering Sharon's 
financial needs and her ability to earn, Sharon is unable to fulfill 
her monthly financial obligations. However, given that Rodney requires 
a monthly financial infusion by the parties1 children, he is unable to 
help provide support for Sharon. Based upon these concessions and 
facts proven at trial, the issue of alimony is not be considered. 
This Court will, however, address the issue of splitting the 
parties' assets. Therefore, this Court makes the following Findings and 
Conclusions: 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
"The overreaching aim of a property division, ... , is to achieve a 
fair, just, and equitable result between the parties. Stated more 
specifically, the purpose of property divisions is to allocate 
property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties and 
best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, Rodney contends that he inherited the farm 
land, water rights, and farm equipment. He therefore asserts that 
3 
Sharon has no claim to any of this property. "[A]s a general rule, 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the 
marriage [should be awarded] to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value." Bradford v. Bradford, 993 
P.2d 887, 892-893 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) . However, 
the trial court should not "consider[] the property division in a 
vacuum." Noble v. Noble, 761'P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
"[I]n appropriate circumstances, a party may be awarded property 
which the other spouse brought into the marriage. In fashioning an 
equitable property division, trial courts must consider all of the 
pertinent circumstances, including the amount and kind of property to 
be divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, the 
parties1 standard of living and respective financial conditions, their 
needs and earning capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the 
parties gave up by the marriage, and the relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony awarded." Naranjo v. Naranjo, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1147-1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). In 
addition, a "wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share of the 
financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties1 joint efforts 
during the marriage." Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (awarding wife equitable share of corporation reasoning that 
wife assumed clerical duties in the business, she reared the parties1 
two children, and performed domestic duties, allowing husband to 
participate full time in the business). 
4 
In the case at hand, Sharon and Rodney both testified to Rodney's 
desire to be on the farm (despite the farm's meager earnings). Sharon 
stated that Rodney "bled brown" due to his love for farming. 
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was 
exposed to bestial living conditions. The furnace in the parties' 
trailer home failed in 1993 and was never repaired. The plumbing in 
the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate. There is no 
water available in the kitchen. The water continuously leaked around 
the base of the water heater, ultimately causing the water heater to 
fall through the floor. Water also rotted the bottom of the stove, 
causing Sharon to disconnect it for safety sake. Neither party has 
been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years. The 
trailer's electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never 
reconnected. 
During this time, any money the parties had that could be used 
to fix these primitive living conditions, was used to service the farm. 
For example, recently the parties had saved $1,200.00 to reconnect 
the electricity. At that same time the hay liner (hay bail wagon) 
was not working. Despite the upcoming winter, the parties decided to 
forego the electricity and repair the hay liner. All the while, 
the parties continued to live without heat, running water and 
electricity. Curiously, the parties somehow found the money to feed 
the livestock, buy seed potatoes and other seeds and to continually 
repair the aging farm equipment. 
Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with 
no utilities with the exception of an extension cord plugged into a 
5 
neighbor's socket. Sharon now showers by filling a bucket with cold 
water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself and sponge bath. As 
well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself 
with cold sandwiches. 
Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this 
farm through the direct efforts of her labor. At trial, Rodney 
attempted to minimize Sharon's work effort, but oft times he 
contradicted his own deposition statements on the same subject. The 
parties' offspring also dwarfed Sharon's work effort on the farm. 
However, cross examination quickly revealed that the parties' children 
have aligned themselves with Rodney in this matter and will reap 
financial benefits if Rodney prevails. For these reasons, this Court 
finds Rodney and his children's statements lack credibility. 
Alternatively, Sharon indicated that she started working on the 
farm in 1967 when the couple was married. She would help change 
sprinkler lines and pulled the hay wagons with the tractors. Sharon 
then moved on to routinely assist in digging the potato crops, feeding 
the cows, hauling and spreading manure, bailing hay, helping to 
gather the barley, driving the grain trucks to Ogden, Utah and 
delivering dead animals to the dump. Sharon was also the designated 
"gopher," being called upon at any time to run for supplies ranging 
from fuel to bailing wire to tractor parts. Also, since the time of 
the parties' marriage, Sharon has handled all of the parties' 
financial matters. 
This responsibility broadened to include the farm's finances 
after Rodney's father died in 1989. Despite all of the farm related 
6 
responsibilities, Sharon was also the primary caregiver to the 
parties1 five children. 
There is no question that, throughout this marriage, Sharon 
significantly participated in the workings of the farm. Equally as 
clear, is the fact that Sharon was not compensated for her work as a 
"farm hand" would be paid. Instead, Sharon and Rodney received 
compensation similar to that of any business owner. The profits or 
losses were co-mingled into the couple's personal household finances. 
This co-mingling is also apparent in the couple's tax filings. 
Sharon testified that every year since the death of Rodney's father 
(1989), Rodney combined the farm and personal household tax returns. 
The Court received the parties1 2005 and 2006 tax returns into 
evidence. In 2005, the parties filed a "married filing jointly" tax 
return. Included in this joint filing is a Schedule F — Profit or 
Loss From Farming. The filing also included a Form 4136 — Credit for 
Federal Tax Paid on Fuel. This form allows a credit for diesel fuel 
and kerosene used on a farm for farming purposes. Both, Rodney and 
Sharonfs name appear on the top of this form. Finally, the tax 
filing includes a Form 4562 - Schedule of Depreciation and 
Amortization. The section titled "Business or activity to which this 
form relates," reads "Livestock-Hay-Grain-Potatoes." 
The 2006 tax return is also a combined form, including personal 
and farming schedules and forms. However, Rodney filed this form 
after the parties had separated and Rodney had received a Protective 
Order against Sharon. Based upon this circumstance, Rodney filed the 
2006 return as "married filing separately." 
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At trial, there was no evidence produced or even alleged that 
the farms1 finances and parties' personal finances were EVER kept 
separate. Further, since 1989, the farm's and parties1 tax returns 
were NEVER filed separately. 
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the 
amount and kind of property (land, water shares and farming equipment); 
the parties standard of living and financial conditions (desperate for 
both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities (little if any); 
the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has 
given up for this marriage (see above): 
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of 
the interest and ownership that Rodney had in 
the farm land, the associated water rights, and 
farm equipment2 when Rodney inherited it from 
his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon. 
2 This inherited farm equipment and its corresponding 
value follows: 
1070 Case Tractor 
Manure Spreader 
995 Case Tractor 
2 - 466 John Deere bailer 
20 hole M.M. grain drill 
Swedish Harrow 
Ford Field Cultivator 
Rolling Mill 
13-6 wheel disk (double) 
Potato Planter (international) 
Potato Digger 
Flair Beater 
$5,500.00 
$ 500.00 
$5,995.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 100.00 
$ 600.00 
$ 350.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 600.00 
$ 150.00 
$ 400.00 
$ 50.00 
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Bale Elevator 
6" Grain Elevator 
1033 New Holland Stack Wagon 
Wheel Type Sprinklers 
1974 70" Howard Rotivator 
Total Value 
$ 200.00 
$ 125.00 
$5,000.00 
$3,500.00 
$3,000.00 
$8,070.00 
Further, at trial some evidence was produced alleging 
that the farm, water rights and farm equipment has been 
subsequently transferred into a trust and are therefore 
inaccessible for property distribution by this Court. In 
fact, NO documents were entered into evidence verifying the 
existence of this trust. This trust is not recorded by the 
appropriate county recorder or any other governmental 
entity against these assets. Finally, the trial unearthed 
many facts that question the motivation and legitimacy of 
the alleged trust. These irregularities include: 
transferring tractors into the names of children who were 
nine, five and one year(s) old at the time of the transfer; 
transferring livestock into the trust three months prior to 
filing for divorce without an accompanying required "brand 
inspection" or any other legal indicia of a transfer; and 
Rodney's transferring all of his assets into the trust 
without compensation and without retaining sufficient 
assets to satisfy his outstanding obligations. Therefore, 
this Court also finds: 
There is no legal basis for the alleged 
trust discussed in trial, therefore 
this Court has the ability to equitably 
divide said assets. 
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Further, based upon equity and consis tent with t h i s Court 's 
findings above, the remaining personal, property i s divided as 
follows: 
Property Granted to Sharon Property Granted to Rodney 
1973 Ford F250 
197 6 GMC 
JTotal Assets 
$ 300.00 
$1,700.00 
$2,000.00 
M 
H 
S 
6 
M 
M 
M 
M 
6 
it 
1954 BF M.M. Tractor 
1961 Chevrolet Dump Truck 
Mower E-10 Case 
64 0 John Deere Rake 
1994 Befco 12 Wheel Rake 
1976 Massie Fergusson Combine 
Potato Cutter 
1952 I.H. Farmal Tractor 
1984 GMC 4x4 
1982 Volkswagon Pick-up 
1991 Geo Metro 
1956 John Deere Tractor 
1988 12' Mower Conditioner 
1988 200 gal. Century sprayer 
2 set of Horrows 
John Deere 2 row planter 
Massie Ferguson 2 way plow 
Total Assets 
$ 100.00 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 150.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 2,000.00 
$ 6,500.00 
$ 75.00 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 3,000.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 325.00 
$ 1,500.00 
$ 7,500.00 
$ 600.00 
$ 400.00 
$ 300.00 
$ 800.00 
$25,650.00 
The debts are assigned as follows: 
Debt Assigned to Sharon Debt Assigned to Rodney 
Express Recovery 
Francis Flores 
$2490.00 
$1,900.00 
Rodney's Medical Bill 
Utah Mortgage 3 
Omnium Worldwide 
$ 12,599.00 
$ 14,275.00 
$ 109.00 
10 
Total Debt $ 4,390.00 
ERS Solutions 
American Debt Col. 
Tooele County 
Farm Land Prop Tax 
Total Debt 
$ 89.00 
$ 914.00 
$ 378.00 
$ 2,120.00 
$30,444.00 
3 This represents one-half of the loan taken on the farm by 
Rodney and his brother (his brother assumes responsibility for the 
other one-half of the loan) . 
The debt associated with Alyssa's (the parties1 
granddaughter) Medical debt occurred after the separation of 
the parties. This debt is therefore not marital property and 
will not be assigned. Similarly, the debts associated with Mr. 
Elwood Buxton ($48,000) and Mr. Rocky Russell ($19,000) are not 
assigned. At trial, the parties indicated that these debts are 
dormant and neither party anticipates further legal action to 
prove or collect the alleged outstanding debts. 
Each party will be responsible for its own attorney's fees. 
Mr. Buhler is ordered to prepare Findings and a Decree 
consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this (;CT*~ day of/(fail 
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REAL PROPERTY 
icription Value" 
il Property: 
interest in farm at 4311 No. Cochrane 
How acquired 
$250,000.00 Inherited from Rodney's father 
15-4816 
15-4817 
15-4818 
15-4819 
15-4820 
15-4821 
15-1267 
15-1400 
15-1395 
15-1394 
15-1091 
15-1124 
Acre ft. 
52.48 
6.115 
6.115 
7.98, 
8.274 
21.00 
16.52 
6.60 
2.814 
2.52 
2.405 
1.995 
( K * 
WATER RIG 
How acquired 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Owners 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
JSsgich, 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Inherited 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Grgich, 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
Rodney F. 
& Brenda 
& Brenda 
& Brenda 
& Brenda 
& Brenda 
& Brenda 
& Jerry & 
& Jerry & 
& Jerry & 
& Jerry & 
& Jerry & 
& Jerry & 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
& Rodney Jr. & Brittney 
Marlin & Sidney 
Marlin & Sidney 
Marlin & Sidney 
Marlin & Sidney 
Marlin & Sidney 
Marlin & Sidney 
0, \1H A* ^ 
VM ? if 
fr 
0^ 
Total 
Total 
2006 
K - 2007 £<>>/ / 
2008 ^ 
2009 
RODNEY'S INCOME 
Amount -Source 
$22,003.80 
$534.75 
$13,377.00 
$3,004.00 
$39,319.55 
P"' Capitol Roofing _ ^ ^ 
U.S. Dept of Agriculture , -
v ^ ^ 
V*.' 
Federal retirement 
Farming 
y-
$40,000.00 approx. 
(Rodney does not have tax return. He believes was about the 
same and from the same sources) 
$2,100.32 
$112.34 
$13,440.00 
$1,280.00 
5,564.00 
$3,517.00 
$26,013.66 
^ K -
Capitol Roofing 
U.S. Dept of Agriculture 
Federal retirement y 
Cashed in life insurance 
Cashed in life insurance 
$890.00 per month 
$215.00 per month 
$890.00 per month ? 
$215.00 per month? 
Farming 
Federal Retirement 
Social Security ^ 
Federal Retirement 
Social Security 
$1056.00 
$256.00 JHr( 
Federal Retirement 
Social Security 
'[^K\ i^Lx 
ao^^ 
p- VF^ 
chicles: p 
y K 
76 GMC 3/4 ton C^~^ 
82 Volkswagen pickup jv*> *-v"-»/ 
91 Geo Metro 
]jsi\ & v * C 
•ailers: 
67 Columbia 12x51 
71 Fleetwood 
>ws: 
der cows-(15 @ $300.00) 
ill - (1 @ $800.00) 
der Calves - (4 @ 250.00) 
nmger calves - (5 @ $100.00) 
???? 
$100.00 
$100.00 
$0.00 
$1,200.00 
$4,500.00 
$800.00 
$1,000.00 
$500.00 
Gift v v ^ 6 T £ > ^ 
Purchased for $1,400.00 j l / ^ l «L/Uft*~" 
Purchased ( v r 6 ^ 1 ^ "~ 
c^R^p^ 
Purchased for $4,700.00 ^ A S K ^ 
Gift < % ~ O ^ M 0 
it - ^YU> 
$o J <5 
»e^ 
Older than 3 months 
Under 3 months \P^ \ JU-
C6 c > 
Ov 
^ W ^ 
s-half of herd is owned by Rodney's brother. Rodney inherited from father 9 cows, 6-7 calves and "l/2mterest in bull. 
Item Description of Item-Troy Gowans Condition | Mileage/hrs. | Quanity | Price | Value 
1 [1977 Case Model 995 Tractor-P/S pusing oil into engine V Hydraulic for remote needs new kit- SN 995A11071013 Fair 1557 hrs. 
.Century Sprayer - PTO, 30' wand, 200 gallon tank 
$6,000.00 $6,000.001 
Fair N/A $350.00 $350. OQL^-
1976 MF 760 Combine, 24' header - SN 174603982 Fair No Meter $4,500.00 $4,500.00 
1988 7' harrows, 2 sections Fair N/A $180.00 $360.00 
CV^ Case Trail behind 7' mower, sickle bar Fair N/A $350.00 $350.00 
6120" Speed King Grain Elevator Poor N/A $25.00 $25.00 
1961 Chev. MDL 60 Dump Truck w/14' Bed - Stock Sides £ 5+2 transmission, very worn rubber Poor over 100,000 $750.00 $750.00 
8 Gehl 60 bushel roller feed mill mixer Fair N/A $350.00 J350.00 
24' Hay elevator Fair N/A $50.00 $50.00 
Farmall H Tractor, 20% rubber Poor No meter $850.00 $85O0OV^ 
987 Case Mdl 1490 Swather, 12 foot header, SN 101684 Fair N/A $1,500.00 $1,500.00<LZ^ 
John Deere 466 Wire Type Baler, SN 261062E Fair N/A $1,800.00 $1,800.00 g> ^ 3])Gopher Poison Machine, Pull type Fair N/A $150.00 $150.00 John Deere Model 640 10' rake, SN 214870E, needs 3 new tires 
gear box loose Poor N/A 
^?5^Case 1210 Tractor, Power Steering crack, 40% rubber, SN 12101151923 
$175.00 $ 1 7 5 . 0 0 1 ^ 
Fair No Meter 
$3,500.0Qf^ Needs new tires (No picture on this tractor) Poor No Meter $3^500.00 
floline 20 hole grain drill w/grass seeded Fair N/A $250.00 $250.00 
John Deere 466 baler (parts only) Parts N/A $100.00 $100.00 
assey Ferguson 2 row potatoe digge r- No Serial number Fair N/A $200.00 $200.00 
ff§]|Massey Ferguson Model 57 3 bottom rollover plow Fair N/A $350.00 $350.00 
20|Eversman Model 7, 13-6 wheel disk (Double) SN 12414 Fair N/A $1,100.00 $1,100.004-
21 |Home built spring harrows w/gauge wheels, 13-6 Fair N/A $500.00 $500.00f-— 
221 Acme 2-6' harrows Fair N/A $150.00 $300.00 
23j John Deere Model 71 two row corn planter 
£ 
i/A 
4^71 hrs. 
$100.00 $100.00 
24|Case Model 1070 Tractor, needs new transmission, 0% rubber Poor/Salvage 
1976 International Loadstar 1600, 5+2 transmission 
14' Hoist, VIN D052FHB14432 113,979 
$1,500.00 $1,500.004—• 
$750.00 $750.00 
2611974 Howard rotovator, 7' wide, Model E70 Fair N/A $500.00 $500.0Oh— 
27|McCormick Model 2 row potatoe planter w/fertilizer tanks Fair N/A $250.00 $250.00 
2811956 John Deere Model 60 Tractor (No S/N) 
Clutch has seal leak, needs new gaskets, needs new rubber No Meter $850.00 $856.004—" 
1994 Befco 12 wheel rake, S/N 156497 N/A 
Home buit 3 point-3 row cultivator N/A 
$2,000.00 $2,000.00 
$150.00 $150.00 
John Deere 2 row cultivator, S/N0007 Fair N/A $150.00 $150.00 
31 1973 Ford Truck Poor N/A $100.00 $100.00 
32 7' vine beater Fair N/A $25.00 $25.00 
I Condition | Mileage/hrs. | Quanity | Price | Value 
Salvage N/A $100.00 $100.00 
Salvage N/A $20.00 $ 2 0 . 0 0 ^ 
Poor N/A $150.00 $150.00 
Fair N/A $250.00 $250.001^ 
$75.0oT 
$500.00 V/ 
Fair N/A $75.00 
Fair Over 100,000 $500.00 
Poor N/A $100.00 $100.00 
Fair N/A $1,200.00 $1,200.00 
$32,280.00 
Item 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Description of Item-Troy Gowans 
Minneapolis Moline Tractor (Stored in shed) 
Seed Cutter 
Wood side manure spreader (no pitches) 
1973 Ford Model 117 7'-9 shank field cultivator 
Home built hang-on V ditcher 
1984 GMC Sierra 1500, 4x4 Truck, VINGTEK14H8EJ501494 
1966 Chev. K10 Pickup, 6 cyl., no brakes, rusted out 
Allumack 1/4 miles of 4" wheel line, bent up wheels 
TOTAL 
Lynn E. Livingston, Appraiser 
Date: 
rediter-
DEBTS 
-Ameunt-
ooele County Treasurer 2000 
tah Mortgage 28550.25 
Iwood Buxton 20000 
SUBTOTAL 50550.25 
fountain Medical 11.06 
fountain West Radiology 22.41 
DS Hospital 865.5 
DS Hospital 6634.89 
tah Heart Clinic 137.28 
IC 3786.94 
fountain West Family Practice 19.42 
an Flint 7.84 
imont Hanley & Assoc. 17.55 
fountain West Medical 169.9 
•ofessional Acct. Services 20.77 
nited Recovery Group 3 93.5 5 
fountain West Anesthesia 368.06 
Ita View Hospital 98.03 
SUBTOTAL 12559.2 
tah Pathology Services 100.85 
Doele Valley Urgent Care 40.98 
fountain West Medical 104.4 
IC Medical Group 316 
Doele Foot & Ankle Clinic 70 ^ ^ 
SUBTOTAL 632.23 
>cpress Recovery Services 2490.11 
rnnium Worldwide Inc. 109.14 
aoele County Q3&6T 
•ancisFlores 1900 
RS Solutions 89.91 
merican Debt Collection C - C <• 914.17 
ocky Russell _19000 
SUBTOTAL 24881.96 
TOTAL 116,744.5 
Purpose 
Property taxes on farm land 
I 
f¥^5 
Mortgage on farm land by Rodney and Rodney Jr. 
Judgment lien on farm land 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill ( from assault by Sharon) 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill ^ A 
Rodney's medical bill ^ l ^y-
-10& ^ 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
Rodney's medical bill 
& 
ov \P U\ V 
p j T ^ 
Alyssa's medical bill 
Alyssa's medical bill 
Alyssa's medical bill 
-fC, Alyssa's medical bill 
Alyssa's medical bill 
\H ^ "\ \ 
fi> f (A^ 
Collection account . f i ^ L f * * * ^ • p<^vT^ 
Collection account - telephone bill 
Waste-drspusal f>Mp 
Personal loan from Francis to Sharon fi^ 
Collection account - telephone bill 
Collection account \ ^P^-
Judgment Cc Y \° L~^ f^-0 
&* 
FCTWII 9ftR 
PifcNa. 
*~ //gV TITLE ABSTRACT SHEET FOR WATER RIGHT NO. s<5 
Total Amount in Right (AC.-FL, Uses, &/or CFS): ^3. ¥ *c**S /^<*^ts*U>t<?ks J 
NOTICE: No agency of the Slate of Uiah warrants or guarantees title to certain water rights. The State Engineer's Office serves 
only as an office of public record. The water right information provided here reflects that which has been filed with the 
State Engineer's Office by the public. If an opinion of title assurance is desired, an attorney or other qualified profes-
sional should be retained. 
Assignment^ Warranty Deed_ Quitclaim Deed_ 
Decree (Court Name and Case No.): Distribution (Probate)^ 
Divorce 
Quiet Tille 
Bankruptcy 
Adjudication^ 
Death Certification (If Joint Tcnant)_ 
Date Signed_^/_-/ ^ V / *?Q 
Date R c c ' d _ 4 L / 2 - / 7 ^ 
File Changed $ / & I &0 isy , r'U* N 
Grantor / V W ^ ^ /r^^y^^/f ('&*Z/6LJ2 ) 
Other 
Date Recorded. 
Title Work Processed By 
B y fajf \ Database Changed. 
(iranlec(s) 
^ 
Sheriff's Deed 
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE " 
Recorded at Request of 
at M Fee Paid $_ 
by. Dep Boole Page. Ref ... 
Mail tax notice to_ Address. 
QMt-OIiHait Btth 
RODNEY FRANK GRGICH 
, grantor, 
of T o o e l e , Countyof T o o e l e .State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to RODNEY FRANK GRGICH, BRENDA ICATHLEEN GRGICH, RODNEY 
GRGICH, J R . , BRITTNEY KAYE GRGICH a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l r i g h t s 
of s u r v i v o r s h i p and n o t a s t e n a n t s m common 
o f
 T o o e l e C o u n t y , U t a h 
, grantee, 
• - - TEN a n d n q / 1 0 0 )0,d and , a n d o t h e r s o o n , v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the following aescrfbecrtract oTIand in T O O e 1 e 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
^ounty, 
State of Utah 
SEE DESCRIPTION ATTACHED 
BQOr,. J?? 
v J r U i I i i c . V U 0 3 2 12 4 
p.--r,F &0- =57/ co»'W s i^rtTKivC 
DEPUTY 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 
J a n u a r y , A.D , one thousand nine hundred and N i n e t y . 
RODNEY FRAM G E ^ I C S ^ O / 
day of 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTYOF TOOELE ss 
On the 25th day of J a n u a r y 
RODNEY FRANK GRGICH 
duly a c t o ( ^T"! jn[^^ the same 
I *i EXHIBIT I 
,19 9 0 , personally appeared before me 
, the signer of the within instrument, who 
midu HJddjiu. 4 
Beginning 10 chains East of the Northwest corner of 
the Northeast quarter of Section 32, T2S, R4W; East 
23.30 chains, South 12.14 chains, West 23.30 chains 
North-, 12.14 chains to the beginning; contajLning 
2§ .83 .acres jnore or less; after excluding the one (1) 
acre deeded to~Marfin Grgich, described as follows: 
Beginning on the West line of Cochrane Lane 
at a point North 89 37'02" East 2156.29 feet along 
Section line and South 0 20,48,, East 801.23 feet 
from the North 1/4 corner Section 32, Township 
2 South; Range 4 West, SLB & M; thence running 
North 89 37'02" West 541.8 feet; thence North 
0 20'48" West 72.0 feet; thence North 89 37'02" East 
344.8 feet; thence South 0 20!48" East 41.3 feet; 
thence North 89 37'02" East 72.0 feet; thence North 
0 20f48" West 101.8 feet; thence North 89 37'02" East 
125.0 feet to Cochrane Lane; thence South 0 20'48" 
East 132.5 feet to beginning, Erda, Tooele County, 
State of Utah* Containing 1.0 acres, with all 
improvements and appurtenances. 
^ D P ^ D ^ * *1 
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM 1of5 
Parcel Abstract 
This abstract is complete as of 1/29/2007 11:50:43 AM Except Water / Mineral Documents 
Parcel number 05-048-0-0008 
Effective 1/1/1996, 26.830 acres 
BEG 660 FT E OF NW COR OF NE 1 
Grantors Grantees Instrument Type 
& Consideration 
BUHLERGARY Grgich sharon ATTORNEY'S 
LIEN 
$0.00 
GRGICH Grgich rodney LIS PENDENS 
SHARON frank petitioner $0.00 
RESPONDENT
 G r g j c h s h a r o n 
GRGICH respondent 
RODNEY 
FRANK 
PETITIONER 
j^CASE #064300444 DA (1/23/2007 8:19:00 AM) 
BUHLERGARY Grgich sharon ATTORNEY'S 
LIEN 
$0.00 
^NOTICE OF ATTORNEY'S LIEN (1/2/2007 4:45:00 PM) _ 
Utah Mortgage Steve Goorman ASSGN OF 
Center Revocable Trust TRUST DEED 
$0.00 
Instrument Entry # 
Date Book/Page 
1/20/2007 276405 
0/66357 
1/20/2007 276404 
0/66355 
12/20/2006 275222 
0/61898 
9/21/2005 251501 
0/0 
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Filing Date & 
Time 
1/22/2007 
10:11 AM 
1/22/2007 
10:11 AM 
1/2/2007 
2:11 PM 
12/12/2005 
2:35 PM 
^OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Jensen Ivan O Utah Mortgage ASSGN OF 
Trustee 35% int Center TRUST DEED 
Jensen $ 0 - 0 0 
Marguerite C 
Trustee 
Pollett R Alva 
Trustee 65% Int 
Pollett E Trustee 
9/21/2005 251500 
0/0 
12/12/2005 
2:35 PM 
Affected 
Documents 
141420/602/4 
29 
141420/602/4 
29 
General - NOTARY DOES NOT MATCH GRANTOR CLAUS (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Parry Edwin B Grgich Rodney 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
NOTICE OF 
DEFAULT 
$0.00 
10/21/2003 
^
eHerll L.69?/4^9Jll1420J6/9/2iOO£7:42:00 PM)_ 
Parry Edwin B Grgich Rodney NOTICE OF 1/9/2003 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
DEFAULT 
$0.00 
213860 
904/589 
194203 
814/280 
11/14/2003 
12:02 PM 
1/14/2003 
11:34 AM 
kr> Ll_/ 
i PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM 
Parcel Abstract 
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General - 602/429 141420 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Parry Edwin B PUBLIC CANCEL OF 
NOTICE OF 
DEFAULT 
$0.00 
General - 703/91 168926 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Parry Edwin B Grgich Rodney NOTICE OF 
Frank DEFAULT 
Grgich Rodney $ 0 - 0 0 
Jr 
General - 602/429 141420 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Parry Edwin B Grgich Rodney RECONVEYANCE 
$0.00 
general -J4Q/Q4 123677 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
10/2/2001 
9/10/2001 
12/27/1999 
170167 
708/463 
168926 
703/91 
142503 
606/117 
10/9/2001 
11:37 AM 
9/12/2001 
10:30 AM 
1/11/2000 
11:10AM 
ASSGN OF 
TRUST DEED 
$0.00 
Utah Mtg Center Alva R 
Inc Trustee /6500 
Jensen Ivan O 
Trustee 
Jensen 
Marguerite C 
Trustee /3500 
Pollett E Trustee 
_?eJle!ll l 6 0 i / 4^ 9J. 4 1 l?°J 6 / -? / 2° 0 6 7 : i 2 . : 0 0 p M ) . 
Grgich Rodney Parry Edwin B TRUST DEED 
$20,000.00 
12/27/1999 142153 
605/148 
12/15/1999 
Utah Mtg Cent 
Inc 
141420 
602/429 
1/4/2000 
1:59 PM 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
12/17/1999 
9:44 AM 
Utah Mtg Center Jensen Ivan O 
Co-Trustee 
ASSGN OF 
TRUST DEED 
$0.00 
1/8/1999 125352 
551/319 
1/27/1999 
12:37 PM 
Jensen 
Marguerite C Co 
-Trustee 
J?eJ2e!2, L?46/84 l l3 .6?! &9!P®67AM°fMJ 
Beardshall D Grgich Rodney SUB OF 
Roger F TRUST/RECON 
Parry Edwin B Parry Edwin B $0.00 
Gerieraf ^484/335 104753J6/9/2006 7-42'00 PM) 
Grgich Rodney Parry Edwin B TRUST DEED 
$12,000.00 
Grgich Rodney Utah Mtg Center 
Frank Jr Inc 
1/14/1999 
12/22/1998 
124885 
550/38 
123677 
546/84 
1/20/1999 
8:39 AM 
12/23/1998 
11:37 AM 
251500/0/0 
251501/0/0 
Pacific Rim Beardshall D ASSGN OF 1/2/1998 105403 1/9/1998 
Financial Roger TRUST DEED 486/190 12:30 PM 
Services Corp $0.00 
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM 
Parcel Abstract 
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^General - 484/335 04753 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Grgich Rodney Johnson Paul H TRUST DEED 
F $2,495.00 
Pacific Rim 
Loans 
Corporation 
12/22/1997 
Johnson Jamis Grgich Brittney RECONVEYANCE 8/5/1996 
M Trustee Kaye $0.00 
Grgich Rodney 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
General - 408/357 79345 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Johnson Jamis Grgich Brittney CANCEL OF 
M Trustee Kaye NOTICE OF 
Grgich Rodney DEFAULT 
Frank $ 0 - 0 0 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
General - 408/357 83055 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Johnson Jamis Grgich Brittney NOTICE OF 
M Trustee Kaye DEFAULT 
Grgich Rodney $ 0 ' 0 0 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
^General - 408/357 (6/9/2006 7:42:00^ PMJ _ 
Jenson Ivan O Grgich Rodney SUB OF 
F TRUST/RECON 
Surety Title „ • , <m
 n n 
Agency Surety Title $ 0 - 0 0 
Agency 
S?eILer2l lPl/6I (^/2J?„°6 7ii2i2°.fM). 
Ivan Orville Grgich Rodney SUB OF 
Jensen Trust F TRUST/RECON 
Jensen Ivan Surety Title $ 0 - 0 0 
Orville Agency 
Surety Title 
Agency 
General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 8/4/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 
General ^388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Grgich Rodney Horman Dan TRUST DEED 
Frank 50% Int $19,000.00 
Grgich Rodney Knute III LLC 
Jr 50% Int 
8/5/1996 
2/2/1996 
2/28/1996 
12/19/1995 
PM) 
11/15/1995 
104753 
484/335 
87974 
432/431 
87973 
432/429 
83055 
418/807 
82919 
418/360 
80436 
411/564 
79345 
408/357 
12/23/1997 
3:03 PM 
8/21/1996 
1:42 PM 
8/21/1996 
1:37 PM 
3/28/1996 
1:28 PM 
3/25/1996 
1:10 PM 
12/29/1995 
11:28 AM 
11/16/1995 
11:59 AM 
Grgich Brittney 
Kaye 
A?H~3 
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM 4 of 5 
Parcel Abstract 
Jensen Ivan 0 Surety Title 
Agency 
SUBSTITUTION 
OF TRUSTEE 
$0.00 
8/15/1995 76577 
401/562 
General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Realty Title Grgich Rodney NOTICE OF 
Insurance DEFAULT 
Agency $0.00 
General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
General - FIXED LG LEGAL 7/10/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
5/5/1995 73756 
394/799 
Realty Title Grgich Rodney NOTICE OF 4/17/1995 
Insurance F DEFAULT 
Agency Inc $0.00 
General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
General - 7/30/04 ADDED LG LEGAL KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Jensen Ivan Realty Title SUBSTITUTION 4/17/1995 
Orville insurance OF TRUSTEE 
Agency Inc $0.00 
General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
_Genera! -_ADD TOLG J^GAL7/30/04 KLJ6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Pacific Rim Ivan Orville ASSGN OF 1/5/1995 
Financial Jensen Trust U TRUST DEED 
Services Corp D T $0.00 
General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 742:00 PM) 
General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 7/30/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
73445 
394/80 
73444 
394/78 
71274 
388/840 
8/22/1995 
1:04 PM 
5/5/1995 
2:16 PM 
4/21/1995 
11:07 AM 
4/21/1995 
11:06 AM 
1/18/1995 
11:11 AM 
Grgich Rodney 
F 
Pacific Rim 
Financial 
Services Corp 
TRUST DEED 
$5,000.00 
12/20/1994 
General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 7/30/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM) 
Tooele County 
Assessor 
Grgich Rodney 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
Grgich Brenda 
Kathleen 
Grgich Brittney 
Kaye 
Grgich Rodney 
F 
Grgich Brenda 
Kathleen 
Grgich Brittney 
Key 
Grgich Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Frank 
Grgich Rodney 
Jr 
PUBLIC 
GREENBELT 
WITHDRAWAL 
$0.00 
FARMLAND 
ASSESSMENT 
APPLICATIO 
$0.00 
7/2/1990 
7/12/1990 
70881 
388/65 
35146 
305/35 
35145 
305/34 
12/23/1994 
11:12 AM 
7/12/1990 
4:27 PM 
7/12/1990 
4:02 PM 
A. r> u _ U 
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM 
Grgich Rodney Grgich Marlin 
Parcel Abstract 
EASEMENT 
$0.00 
4/6/1990 34067 
302/755 
5 of 5 
5/7/1990 
7:46 PM 
Grgich Rodney Grgich Brenda QUIT CLAIM 
Frank Kathleen JT DEED 
Grgich Brittney $ 0 - 0 0 
Kaye JT 
Grgich Rodney 
Frank JT 
Grgich Rodney 
JrJT 
1/25/1990 32124 
299/30 
1/25/1990 
1:22 PM 
Eggett Anna G Grgich Marlin PERSONAL REP 1/24/1990 
DEED 
$0.00 
Grgich Rodney Grgich Marlin QUIT CLAIM 
DEED 
$0.00 
1/2/1990 
32118 
298/841 
32117 
298/840 
1/24/1990 
4:00 PM 
1/24/1990 
4:00 PM 
Eggett Anna Grgich Rodney PERSONAL REP 1/24/1990 32116 1/24/1990 
Frank DEED 298/838 4:00 PM 
$0.00 
Bush & Gudgell Grgich Rodney NOTICE OF LIEN 1/22/1990 32080 1/22/1990 
Inc F $0.00 298/757 4:09 PM 
Parents of parcel number 05-048-0-0008 
(The number of generations is indicated by the number of *'s before the parcel number.) 
Children of parcel number 05-048-0-0008 
Generation 1 Generation 2 Generation 3 Generation 4 Generation 5 Generation 6 
ft-O^-^ 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
Name
 rPadfic Rim Financial Grotto 
5Xs 136 South Main Street #700 
f£* Salt Lake City, Utah 
L- 84101 J 
BOOK. 3IL 
0 7 0 8 8 ! 
PAGE. V**' ~ ^ ^ 
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DONNA S. McK?:KDr.;;r: 
TOO/ClE COUNTY RECORDER 
DEPUTY d.w/i*-
- S P A C E ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S U 5 E -
DEED OF TRUST 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of Trust, made this. 
Rodney F, Grqich 
20 th . day o f , December 
whose address is H.C.R. 31 Box 57 , Dugway, Utah 84022 
_ 19 2JL, between 
, as TRUSTOR, 
(Street and number) 
I n w e s t T i t l e S e r v i c e s ,
 t Utah corporation, as TRUSTEE, and . 
Pacific Rim Financial Services, Corporation 
(City) (State) 
_ as BENEFICIARY, 
W i t n e s s e s : That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described 
property, situated in T O O e l e __ County, State of Utah: 
3-2-L 
Beginning at Southeast corner Northwest 1/4 Section 4, Township 3 South, 
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, North 13.33 Rods, West 160 Rods, South 
13.33 Rods, East 160 Roads to Beginning. 
Beginning 660 Feet East of Northwest Corner of Northeast 1/4 of Section 
32, Tonwship 2 South, Range 4 West, S a if Lake Base and Meridian, Running 
Thence East 1537.80 Feet, Thence South 668.73 Feet , South 89 Deg 37'01" 
West 125 Feet; Thence south 0 Deg 20'48" East 101.8 Feet , South 89 Deg 
37'02" West 72 Feet , Thence North 0 Deg 20 !48" West"41.3 F e e t , South 89 Deg 37 !02" West 
344.8 Feet , Thence South 0 Deg 20*48" East 72 Feet , West 996 F e e t , Thence North 801.23 
f ee t to Beginning. 
4*~ 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, 
hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to snd conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits. 
Por the Purpose of Securing: 
( I ) payment of the Indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof In the principal sum of f *2 , £ > Q O . foiO , 
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the time*, In the manner and with Interest a t therein set forth, a n / a n y extension* and/or r * 
newak or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained} (3) the payment of such additional loam or ad-
. J^ i f a l l W ^ ^ **** P ° r t ^ Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder sholl not operate as a waiver of such right and the waiver by 
Benefklary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent defauH. 
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebted** * secured hereby or in the performance of any 
agre«nent hereunder, all sum. secured hereby shall immediately become due ond payable at the option of Benefkiory. In the event of such default. 
Beneficiary may execute or cous* Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be soW to satisfy the obliga-
t i o n hereof, ond Trustee sholl file such notice for record In each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof Is situated. Beneficiary 
also sholl deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by taw following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default and 
notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the tune 
and place designated in sold notke of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and In such order as it may determine (but subjoct to any satutory 
right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), of public auction to the highest 
bidder, the purchase price payable In lawful money of the United Stoles at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for ony cause he 
deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until H shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by 
public declaration thereof by such person at the time and pioce last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day 
beyond the day designated in the notke of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notke of sale. Trustee shall execute 
and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property *o sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals In the Deed 
of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply 
the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs ond expenses of exercising the power of sole ond of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's 
ond attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sate ond revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended 
under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at per annum from date of expenditure; (4) all qther sums then secured hereby; 
and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, In Its discretion, may deposit the balance of such pro. 
ceeds with the County Clerk of the county In which the sole took place. 
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, immediately after 
such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been wmndbnd by Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declore all sums secured hereby immediately due ond pay-
able and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled 
to recover in such pwdlngt a l l costs ond expenses Incident thereto, including o reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
20. Benefieiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which said 
property or some part thereof is tltuated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to 
oil the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of ony successor trustee. Eoch such substitution shall be executed and ocknowl. 
edged, ond notice thereof shall be given ond proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
2 1 . This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, executors, 
successors ond assign*. All obligations of Trustor hereunder on Joint and several. The term "Benefkiory" shall mean the owner ond holder, including 
ony pledgee, of the n«9 secured hereby. In this D^d of Trust, whenever me context so nqulr**, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, 
•ond the singular number includes the plural. 
22. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Xru%t, duly executed ond acknowledged, is mode a public record as provided by law. Trustee is not 
obiigoted to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee 
shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address herein* 
before set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
s y _ ^ X ^ > <_S^><^^^. tZ. 
STATE 
County 
19, ' y personally appeared before me . 
NotaryFUBlic, Reaidini"il 
personally appeared before roe . 
, who being by me duly sworn did say, each tor aims*!*, that he, the said . 
, President, and he, the saldL, to the . 
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said -
Secretary 
_, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
. and . 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed Is the seal of said corporation. . 
My Commission expires: . 
*7 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: BOOR 2£32 ^(IMff'Q[f£f£— 
Wasatch Credit Corp. 0 7 9 3 4 5 95 NOV 16 AMIWS9 
PAr>r 357" n5°f DONUA s . ».!^ >:::-w;.iCX 
220 South 200 East #110 rw l/H/ PT AB .TOOELE COUNH U S C C K J L I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 j / P^UTY _ ( 2 J z L . FFF^/TT*2 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 15th day of November, 1995, 
between, Rodney Frank Grgich, Rodney Grgich Jr., and Brittney Kaye 
Grgich whose address is 4311 N. Cochrane Lane, Erda Utah, as 
Trustor. 
Jamis M. Johnson, Esq., as Trustee. 
Knute III, LLC 50% Interest and Dan Horman 50% Interest, as 
Beneficiary. 
TRUSTOR hereby COVENANTS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property situated in 
Toooele County, Utah: 
See attached addendum "A" 
together with all water rights owned by Rodney Grgich 
Jr, Rodney Frank Grgich and Brittney Kaye Grgich. 
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said 
property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by a Trust Deed Note, of even date herewith, in the 
amount of: 
Ninetten thousand Dollars $19,000.00 
Payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the 
manner and with interest as therein set forth, and Payment of any 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security 
hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above 
jay 
property, to pay all charges and assessments on water or water 
stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to 
maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, 
to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including 
Trustee's and attorney's fees) in event of default in payment 
of the indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services performed by Trustee hereunder, 
including a reconveyance hereof. If any property taxes or insurance 
fees are not paid, the beneficiary at Knute III, LLC and Dan 
Hormans option may pay the taxes, and charge twenty percent of the 
tax payment as a penalty, and charge thirty six percent interest on 
the tax payment, penalty, and accrued interest compounded daily. 
The Beneficiary requests that a copy of any notice of default 
and or any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address 
hereinbefore set forth. 
Rodney^ranV-Grgich 11\15\95 
11\15\95 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
Brittney $aye Gr<£Jch 11\1J5\95 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 15th day of November, 1995, personally appeared before 
me, Rodney Frank Grgich, Rodney Grgich Jr., and Brittney Kaye 
Grgich the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
fI$8rm 1 Notary Public My Commission Expires 
Residing at 
^^rtf 
1-Amd. 1-62 
Name 
Street 
City/state 
WHEN RECORDED MAE. TO 
THE PACIFIC RIM GROUP 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET #500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
y\ 1 0 4 7 5 3 B 0 4 S 4 P 0 3 3 5 
DATE 23-DEC-1997 15Z03PH 
FEE: 18.00 CHECK 
DONNA S. i1CKENDRICK> RECORDER 
F I L E D BY I1RT 
1/?OR PACIFIC RIH FINANCIAL SERVICES 
^TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE 
DEED OF TRUST 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This D e e d of Trust, made this 22 day of December, 19 97, between Rodney F. Gtpch as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 4311 North Cochrane Lane, Tooele, Utah, 84074 , and PAUL H. JOHNSON, attorney, as 
TRUSTEE, and PACIFIC RIM Loans CORPORATION, as BENEHCIARY, 136 South Main Street #500, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101 
Witnesses: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, W T H POWER OF 
SALE, the following described property, situated in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: 
See attached Exhibit "A". 
PARCEL # 05-048-0-0008 
PROPERTY ADDRESS : 4311 Cochrane Lane, Tooele, Utah, 84074 
Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred 
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits. 
For the Purpose of Securing; 
(1) Payment of the mdebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of 2,495.00 made by Trustor, 
payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or 
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that 
they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the 
terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the Promissory Note or notes secured by 
this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided. 
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply 
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or 
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be 
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof 
is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees: 
J?Jz 
by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by 
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an 
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the Hen or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to 
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the 
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in 
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in 
such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and 
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release 
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant 10 such 
notice. 
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the 
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of 
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the 
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said 
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said 
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents 
evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default 
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the 
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may 
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known 
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States 
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until 
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at 
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated 
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in 
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof, Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at 
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of 
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with 
such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest 
at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust from date of 
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto; 
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale 
took place. 
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due 
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in 
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the 
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each 
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner 
provided by law. 
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, 
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the 
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the 
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law. 
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in 
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the 
address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
STATE 
County 
OFUJAH 
of T<V,p \ j l 
On the , 3 , 3 day of \ \ > f , A.D. 19 personally appeared before me 
_kodn/j—E—hfa\tS 
the signer 
X 4 L - CJT 6ltCV^ 
\J ^ of the within ir&irument, who duly acknowledged to me that \ V ^ executed the same. 
My Commission expires: ^ J l V \ l [ . ?J 1 rxY\ \ ^ _ ^ 
Notary Public, Residing at 
STATE OF UTA$ 
County of 
NOTARY PUBUg 
A DAVlDmifr 
1d68oiithM«m#0OO 
On the day of , A.D. 19 personally appeared before me 
and 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said 
is the President, and he, the said 
of 
, is the Secretary 
, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
and each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and 
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
My Commission expires: _______________________________
-
______
-
___«
- -
^ 
Notary Public, Residing at 
r Deed of Trust 1 
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REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full.) J 
To 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the I 
within Deed of Trust. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust has been I 
fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and direaed, on payment to you of any sums owing to I 
you under the terms of said Deed of Trust, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of 
indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust delivered to you herewith, together with the said Deed of Trust 
and to Reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Deed of Trust all the estate 
now held by you thereunder. 
Dated , _9 
1
 
uf 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER, INC. 
1568 S. 500 W., #101 
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010 
E 1 S 3 6 7 7 B 0 5 4 6 P 0 0 8 4 
Date 23-DEC-1998 lls37am 
Fees 19.00 Check 
??!&# fa flg^ENORICK, Recorder 
S«lW.BaHHr 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE 
DEED OF TRUST 
. WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This D e e d o f Trust , made this 2 2 N P day of DECEMBER, 19 1998 . between RODNEY GRGICH 
A N D RODNEY FRANK GRGICH TR. as TRUSTOR, whose address is 4311 COCHRANE LANE 
TOOELE UT 84074 , and Edwin B. Parry, attorney, as TRUSTEE, and UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER, 
INC. as BENEFICIARY, 1568 S. 500 W., #101, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
Witnesses: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF 
SALE, the following described property, situated in TOOELE County, State of Utah: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM 
PARCEL*05-048-0-0008 
PROPERTY ADDRESS : 4311 COCHRANE LANE TOOELE UT 84074 
Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred 
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits. 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) Payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $12,000.00 made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set £ortht and any extensions and/or 
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional 
loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes 
reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or 
pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the Promissory Note or 
notes secured by this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided. 
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply 
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or 
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be 
reasonably necessary, die specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof 
is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees: 
by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by 
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an 
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to 
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the 
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in 
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in 
such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and 
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release 
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such 
notice. 
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the 
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of 
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the 
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said 
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said 
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents 
evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default 
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the 
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may 
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known 
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States 
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until 
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at 
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, i£ the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated 
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in 
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at 
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of 
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such 
sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 
the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust from date of 
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto; 
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale 
took place. 
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due 
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in 
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. Prom the time the substitution is filed for record, the 
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each 
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner 
provided by law. 
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, 
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the 
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the 
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law. 
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in 
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the 
address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signatttre of Trustor 
STATE OF UTAH ^ 
County of P/H"/& 
On the ^ g . day of £ > ^ f £ s y * / ^ ^ e , A.D. 19 /<?*?& personally appeared before me 
the signer S of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that "77+^. X^ executed the same. 
My Commission expires: C* ~~ (*& - '* ' ' /""} J 
\7J(Q 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 
NOTARY PUBLIC — 
ROBERT L.K1ME 
136 South Main 
Salt Late City, UT 8 4 1 0 1 . 
My Commission Expires 
June 13th, 1999 
} SS.STATEOFUTAH 
Notary Public, Residing at 
On the day of , A D . 19 personally appeared before me 
and 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said 
is the President, and he, the said 
of 
, is the Secretary 
, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
and each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and 
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
My Commission expires: 
Notary Public, Residing at 
Deed of Trust 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
—Do Not Record -
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full.) 
To 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the 
within Deed of Trust. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust has been 
fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to 
you under the terms of said Deed of Trust, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of 
indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust delivered to you herewith, together with the said Deed of Trust 
and to Reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Deed of Trust all the estate 
now held by you thereunder. 
I Dated 
_ > 1 9 _ 
fl-Aiad. H2 
Name 
Street 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER, INC. 
1568 S. 500 W., #101 
City/State BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010 
UA?-&¥-M WaSr p ° « a g 
Fees 18.00 Check 
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder 
Filed By RGL 
For ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE 
DEED OF TRUST 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of Trust, made this 15TH day of DECEMBER 19 99, between RODNEY FRANK GRGICH 
. ~ & RODNEY GRGICH TRas TRUSTOR, whose address is 4311 NORTH COCHRANE LANE: ERPA, 
^} UT 84074 . and Edwin B. Parry, attorney, as TRUSTEE, and UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER. INC. as 
CO BENEFICIARY, 1568 S. 500 W., #101, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
J £ Witnesses: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF 
t 1 SALE, the following described property, situated in TOOELECounty, State of Utah: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: 
o
cbm%-b'0oo% 
?ARCEL: 
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 4311 NORTH COCHRANE LANE; ERDA,UT 84074 
Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, 
ssues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
vith said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred 
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits. 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) Payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $20,000.00 (TWENTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS) made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
et forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein 
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when 
tfvidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended 
or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest 
ret forth in the Promissory Note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided. 
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees: 
v. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply 
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or 
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be 
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof 
is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees: 
C^^S fy.it 
by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by 
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an 
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to 
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the 
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in 
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in 
such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and 
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release 
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such 
notice. 
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the 
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of 
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the 
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said 
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said 
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents 
evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default 
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the 
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may 
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known 
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States 
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until 
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at 
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated 
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in 
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at 
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of 
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such 
sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 
the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust from date of 
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto; 
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale 
took place. 
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, 
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor. 
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due 
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in 
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the 
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each 
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner 
provided by law. 
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, 
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the 
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the 
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law. 
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in 
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
